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this veracious assertation has been echoed forcefully in recent years
by Judge Morrison" of the present Court of Criminal Appeals. In
order to facilitate the process of criminal justice and to eliminate an
unneeded, harrassing technicality, the Legislature of Texas should
abrogate this distinction between parties to crime. A new enactment
should embrace as principals all who under our present statutes would
be considered either principals or accomplices, thereby once and for
all ending the turmoil and confusion in this sphere of criminal law
in Texas.'
Tom ]. Stollenwerck
Community Property - Life Insurance - Application
of the Inception of Title Doctrine
Plaintiff's husband, prior to marriage, obtained two insurance
policies on his life and made his estate the beneficiary of the policies.
Two-thirds of the total premiums paid on the policies was furnished
by the husband's separate funds before marriage; the remaining one-
third was paid from community funds.' After the death of husband-
insured, his executor included the entire proceeds from the policies
in the husband's separate estate. The widow appealed from an ad-
verse judgment of the district court in a suit to determine title to
the proceeds from the policies. Held: The separate estate of the
husband-insured, as designated beneficiary, is entitled to the entire
proceeds from life insurance policies initially purchased with separate
funds (in this case the policy was purchased by decedent before
marriage), but the community estate has a right of reimbursement
for the amount of premiums paid with community funds. McCurdy
v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref.
There are two alternative theories' that could be used to determine
27 Morrison & Blackburn, supra note 4.
"8An example of such a statute is Iowa Code Ann. § 688.1 (1950): "The distinction
between an accessory before the fact and a principal is abrogated, and all persons concerned
in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting
the offense, or aid and abet its commission, though not present, must hereafter be indicted,
tried, and punished as principals."
'Premiums totaling $1094.66 were paid by the husband-insured out of separate funds
prior to marriage; premiums totaling $657.60 were paid from community funds. McCurdy
v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref.
A third possible method has been suggested for the disposition of life insurance policies
after a change of marital status of the spouses. This method would recognize the proceeds
as the product only of the community funds used to maintain the insurance policy after
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ownership of proceeds from a life insurance policy acquired in part
with community property and in part with the separate funds of the
insured-the tracing principle' and the inception of title doctrine.4
Under the tracing principle, the separate or community ownership
of the proceeds is apportioned according to the separate or com-
munity character of the funds used to pay the premiums.! Under the
inception of title doctrine, the entire proceeds are separate or com-
munity depending upon the character of the funds used in the
initial acquisition' of the life insurance policy.7 Thus, under this
latter doctrine the separate property character of a policy acquired
with separate funds would not be altered by the subsequent use of
community funds for payment of most or even virtually all of the
premiums on the policy
The question presented in the instant case is one of first impres-
sion in Texas; viz., whether the entire proceeds of life insurance
policies acquired with separate property are to be allocated between
marriage, the insurance premiums paid with separate funds having been consumed before
marriage. Under this principle, the proceeds would be impressed with the character of the
funds used to pay the last premium before the death of the insured. Huie, Community
Property and Life Insurance-Substantive Aspects-Developments in Texas, 2 Texas Insti-
tutes 118, 128 (1957). See Sherman v. Roe, 153 Tex. 1, 262 S.W.2d 393 (1953), (in which
the Texas Supreme Court seemed to apply this method).
However, this method fails to consider that premiums paid for life insurance are a single
cumulative asset and not a series of distinct individual investments, each of which is con-
sumed during its respective premium period. See, e.g., Stapf v. U.S., 189 F. Supp. 830 (N.D.
Tex. 1960), modified on other grounds, 309 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
a The tracing principle is applied in California and Washington. First applied to realty
in California, the tracing principle has been extended to life insurance in that jurisdiction.
Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 324, 257 P.2d 721 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Modern Wood-
men of America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 Pac. 754 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931). The
Washington courts adopted the tracing principle as the more equitable means of dividing
proceeds of life insurance policies in fact situations similar to that of the instant case. Me-
tropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, 51 F. Supp. 470 (D. Ore. 1943) (applying Washington
law); Coffey's Estate v. Coffey, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938).
'Arizona, Louisiana, and New Mexico have applied the inception of title doctrine to
life insurance situations. Arizona: Jackson v. Griffin, 39 Ariz. 183, 4 P.2d 900 (1931).
Louisiana: Toussant v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 147 La. 977, 86 So. 415 (1920);
Succession of Verneville, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908); Succession of Buddig, 108 La.
406, 32 So. 361 (1902). New Mexico: In re Miller's Estate, 44 N.M. 214, 100 P.2d 908
(1940); In re White's Estate, 41 N.M. 631, 73 P.2d 316 (1937). The doctrine originated
in Louisiana. See In re Moseman's Estate, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886).
Cases cited note 3 supra. See Huie, supra note 2, at 126.
0 The time at which the right to the proceeds from a life insurance policy is acquired is
a question that has not been settled. But since life insurance policies almost invariably stipu-
late that the liability of the insurer will not attach until the payment of the first premium,
the acquisition date is usually the date of the first premium payment. American Ins. Union v.
Lowry, 62 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1933), cert denied, 289 U.S. 745 (1933). See Rio Grande
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 241 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.;
Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McIntosh, 126 S.W.2d 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error
dism. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 3.44 (1963).
Cases cited note 4 supra.
'See Ray, Life Insurance, Community Property and Death Taxes in Texas, 26 Tex. B.J.
835, 894 (1963).
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the separate and community estates in proportion to the amount of
premiums paid by each estate, or belong entirely to the separate
estate, with the community being allowed only reimbursement for
the actual amount of premiums paid with community funds."
Conflicting claims to life insurance proceeds have been made by
the separate and community estates in previous Texas cases in which
the community was dissolved by the death of one of the spouses. In
these decisions, however, the principal question was whether the
proceeds themselves were property,10 a question that until recently
was not resolved authoritatively." The 1957 legislative amendment
of the definition of "property" to include life insurance," and the
supreme court's decision in Brown v. Lee" finally established that the
right to the proceeds from life insurance policies is property. This
classification of life insurance proceeds as "property" raised the issue
of whether the tracing principle or the inception of title doctrine
would be employed to determine ownership. 4
The problem of acquisition of title to forms of property other
than life insurance previously has been considered in Texas. In re-
solving separate and community claims to the ownership of realty,
Texas courts almost uniformly apply the inception of title doctrine,
' The court in the instant case did not explain or analyze the allowance of a right of
reimbursement to the community with the application of the inception of title doctrine
in favor of the separate estate. Apparently it assumed that a right of reimbursement exists
in situations involving property for which funds of a different character are used to dis-
charge the purchase-money debt after legal title has vested. There is authority to this effect.
Wehring v. Schumann, 83 S.W.2d 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Miller v. Odom, 152 S.W.
1185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.; Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life
Insurance, 17 Texas L. Rev. 121, 147 (1939).
" Prior to Brown v. Lee, - Tex. _ 371 S.W.2d 694 (1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J.
133 (1964), there existed a curious dichotomy among authoritative decisions as to whether
the right to the proceeds from a life insurance policy prior to maturity constituted
property. Decisions holding that proceeds rights are property: Blackmon v. Hansen, 140
Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943); Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (1923);
Martin v. Moran, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 32 S.W. 904 (1895). Contra: Warthan v. Haynes,
155 Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956); Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 145
Tex. 245, 197 S.W.2d 105 (1946); Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624
(1901).
"' Brown v. Lee, supra note 10.
""'Property' includes real and personal property, and life insurance and the effects
thereof." Tex. Ref. Civ. State. Ann art. 23 (1) (1959).
"s Tex. -, 371 S.W.2d 694 (1963).
14 One previous case involving conflicting claims to the cash surrender value of life
insurance policies upon the dissolution of the community by divorce is related somewhat
to the problem raised in the instant case. In Berdoll v. Berdoll, 145 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940) error dism., a policy on the life of a spouse was obtained before marriage,
and part of the premiums were paid from separate and part from community funds. In
that case the tracing principle was applied to apportion the cash surrender value of the
policy as of the time of divorce.
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under which the character of the funds used in the acquisition"5 of
the realty controls ownership."6 This well-established rule was adopted
in Welder v. Lambert," an early supreme court case, in which the
court relied on a Louisiana case which applied the inception of title
doctrine to life insurance.'8 Welder v. Lambert" has been followed
consistently in subsequent decisions." The Texas Supreme Court has
stated the rule applicable to realty as follows: "The character of
title to property as separate or community depends upon the exist-
ence or non-existence of the marriage at the time of the incipiency of
the right in virtue of which the title is finally extended, and that
the title when extended relates back to that time.""
The determination of the ownership of personalty is not as well
settled as that of title to realty. However, substantial importance is
placed upon the character of the funds used in the disposition of
claims to personalty upon the dissolution of the community; appar-
ently, personalty acquired with separate funds will be allocated to
the separate estate if it is not commingled with community property
beyond identification."
In applying the inception of title doctrine to the proceeds of life
insurance policies in the McCurdy case, the court effectuated its con-
ception of the legislative intent in amending the statutory definition
of property to include life insurance; i.e., "to fit life insurance pro-
" Title to realty is acquired fully upon the execution and delivery of the deed. Hall v.
Edwards, 222 S.W. 167 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920). However, when title finally is acquired
the time of acquisition dates back to the time of the incipiency of the right out of which
the title finally is extended. Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490, 109 S.W. 911 (1908).
"0Strong v. Garret, 148 Tex. 265, 224 S.W.2d 471 (1949); Colden v. Alexander, 141
Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943); Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490, 109 S.W. 911
(1908); Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281 (1898); Price v. McAnelly, 287
S.W. 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) error dism. But see Johnson v. Smith, 115 Tex. 192, 280
S.W. 158 (1926); Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 90 S.W. 485 (1906).
791 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281 (1898).
"In re Moseman's Estate, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886).
" 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281 (1898).
"Cases cited note 16 supra.
"Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490, 109 S.W. 911, 912 (1908). The quoted language
is used in many Texas cases. It is misleading in that it is possible to have title incept in
a spouse's separate estate, even if purchased after marriage, if separate property is used in
the initial acquisition. Property purchased with separate property is separate. Love v.
Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851).
" Schmidt v. Huppman, 73 Tex. 112, 11 S.W. 175 (1889); Rauch v. Rauch, 237
S.W. 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Holloway v. Schuttles, 51 S.W. 293 (Tex. Civ. App.
1899). "Tracing" is used in connection with situations involving personalty wholly owned
by a spouse in his or her separate right. In these instances the separate property is
"traced" through various transactions during marriage to maintain its separate identity
from the community. The title is wholly in the separate estate and there is no question of
proportionate ownership resulting front the use of community and separate funds for
purchase payments. But this use of "tracing" is to be distinguished from the tracing
principle relevant to the present case which involves the determination of ownership of
an asset acquired in part with separate funds and in part with community funds. See cases
cited note 3 supra and text accompanying note 5 supra.
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ceeds... to the pattern of Texas community property law as applied
to other types of property."23 The court noted the general applica-
tion of the inception of title doctrine to other forms of property. If
its interpretation of the legislative intent were correct, there would
have been no need to proceed any further; the court would have per-
formed its judicial function by determining the meaning of the 1957
amendment 4 and then applying the statute as interpreted to the
facts of the instant case. In further support of its decision, however,
the court briefly discussed the uniformity and simplicity that would
follow from the adoption of the inception of title doctrine, as op-
posed to the tracing principle. The court stated clearly that the incep-
tion of title doctrine was adopted instead of the tracing principle not
because of any superior qualities of the former or of any inherent
defects in the latter, but rather solely in the overriding interest of
uniformity and simplicity. The application of the inception of title
doctrine to life insurance, the court concluded, would promote the
uniform determination of ownership of all forms of property in
instances involving a change of marital status. The court further
determined that the inception of title doctrine would simplify the
disposition of the proceeds of life insurance policies upon the dis-
solution of the community by the death of one of the spouses; the
only knowledge necessary for the application of this doctrine to
determine ownership is the character of the funds with which title
was acquired."
If the legislature merely sought to resolve the judicial dilemma as
to whether or not life insurance is property, then the 1957 amend-
ment, instead of solving the tracing-inception of title problem (as the
court in McCurdy seemed to think), created it. If the legislature
merely intended to declare life insurance policies property and to rely
upon the judiciary to apply the rules of property law which would
provide the most equitable results in particular life insurance situa-
tions, then in the instant case it would have been necessary for the
court to base its acceptance of the inception of title doctrine upon
thorough analysis of the two available methods.
The court concluded correctly in McCurdy that the application
of the inception of title doctrine will promote uniformity and sim-
plicity in community property law. However, beyond these two
attributes the inception of title doctrine has shortcomings. In fact
"McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref.
24 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 23(1) (1959).
25 That is, once the character of the funds is known, the question of ownership is
closed. With ownership determined, the burden of showing a right of reimbursement is
upon the party claiming such right.
1964]
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situations similar to that in the present case in which the community
is entitled only to reimbursement for its funds used in paying
premiums, the separate estate will receive an interest-free loan thereof
from the community. It follows that the community will be deprived
of the use of its funds for investment or other purposes beneficial to
it. In addition, if an overwhelming percentage of the total premiums
were paid with community funds, the application of the inception
of title doctrine could operate as a constructive fraud on the rights
of the other spouse." The situation would be analogous to one in
which a husband, as manager of the community, makes an inequita-
ble gift of community property to a third person, thereby defeating
his wife's rights. It is established that constructive fraud may exist
in such situations."7 No actual intent to defraud is necessary;" the
fraudulent intent will be implied from the inequitable results of the
transaction.
The tracing principle, on the other hand, could not produce such
inequities. The application of this principle recognizes that the pro-
ceeds are the product of the premiums, " and under this principle they
will be so apportioned. The adoption of the tracing principle in life
insurance-community property situations would produce a disunity
in Texas community property law because of the well-established
application of the inception of title doctrine to realty."1 The tracing
principle, however, has been used in Texas;" in fact, it was applied
" See Martin v. Moran, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 32 S.W. 904 (1895).
" This result is derived from the defrauded-creditor situations. If a transfer of
property by a debtor produces an infringement upon the rights of the creditor, the debtor
is held as a matter of law to have intended to defraud the creditor. See Guaranty State
Bank & Trust Co. v. Maxwell, 15 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). The courts have
extended this doctrine to gifts by the husband of community property to third persons,
regardless of his intent in doing so. Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857
(5th Cir. 1953), on second appeal, 220 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1955); Biccochi v. Casey-
Swasey Co., 91 Tex. 259, 42 S.W. 963 (1897); Watson v. Harris, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 263,
130 S.W. 237 (1910). See Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance,
18 Texas L. Rev. 121, 130-37 (1940).
28 Constructive fraud is to be distinguished from actual fraud in which a definite
intent to perpetrate a fraud must be shown. Generally, actual fraud consists of six necessary
elements: (1) A material misrepresentation (2) that is false, (3) with the speaker having
knowledge of the falsity of the statement or having made it without reasonably attempting
to ascertain the truth of it. (4) The statement must have been made with the intention
that it would be relied upon. (5) It actually must have been relied upon. (6) The person
so relying must have suffered some harm or injury thereby. Watson v. Brazelton, 176
S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). See Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624
(1901); Jones v. Jones, 146 S.W. 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Rowlett v. Mitchell, 52
Tex. Civ. App. 589, 114 S.W. 846 (1908).
2"Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953), on second appeal,
220 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1955).
30 Huie, supra note 2, at 129.
" Cases cited note 16 supra.
"
5 Johnson v. Smith, 115 Tex. 192, 280 S.W. 158 (1926); Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex.
411, 90 S.W. 485 (1906); Berdoll v. Berdoll, 145 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App, 1949)
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in a divorce situation otherwise very similar to that of the instant
case.
The instant decision cannot be questioned if the court construed
correctly the legislative intent that the rules of law presently applica-
ble to other forms of property should be extended to life insurance.
If, however, the legislative intent was restricted to defining life insur-
ance as property, as it most likely was, then the virtues of uniformity
and simplicity are not sufficient to overcome the unjust results that
the inception of title doctrine may produce in certain life insurance
situations. This purely mechanical doctrine will not provide for the
equitable, reasoned determination of conflicting claims by the com-
munity and separate estates to life insurance proceeds. In contrast,
the rejected tracing principle effectuates by equitable apportionment
the realistic notion that the proceeds from a life insurance policy
are a product of, or a return on, the funds invested as premiums.
Although the supreme court has evidenced its approval of the instant
decision by refusing a writ of error, 4 it is hoped that the results which
will flow from the application of the inception of title doctrine to
life insurance will cause this decision to be reconsidered.
Don E. Williams
error dism.; Warthan v. Haynes, 272 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (This case was
decided by the supreme court on the basis that the proceeds were not property before
maturity; the court did not rule on the method of disposition of the proceeds.)
S Berdoll v. Berdoll, supra note 32.
347 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 246 (Feb. 29, 1964).
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